INTERROGATORIES - St. James' Standard Interrogatories and Standard Request for Production of Documents August 28, 2020 (2024)

Case

United Financial Casualty Company v. Jahnell Ennis A/K/A JAHNELL SUZETTE ENNIS, Brian Brown A/K/A BRIAN OWEN BROWN, American Medical Initiatives, P.C., Bowen, Md, Pllc., Bright Star Rehab Physical Therapy, P.C., Joseph A. Raia, M.D., P.C., Linden Line, Inc., Live Better Pharmacy, Corp., Medex Diagnostic And Treatment Center, Llc., Medoply, Inc., Mimosa Acupuncture, P.C., Namaste Psychological Services, P.C., Ortho Sports Supply, Inc., Unique Dme, Inc., Vsb Physical Therapy, P.C.

Aug 16, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614537/2024

Case

Aug 16, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614515/2024

Case

Jhonatan Gutierrez, Jose Fabicela v. Pgn Outdoor Solutions, Inc., John Doe

Aug 14, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614339/2024

Case

Elizabeth Luna Guiracocha v. The County Of Nassau, The Town Of Hempstead, The Incorporated Village Of Malverne,

Aug 14, 2024 |Ellen Tobin |Torts - Other Negligence (TRIP AND FALL) |Torts - Other Negligence (TRIP AND FALL) |614377/2024

Case

Progressive Advanced Insurance Company v. Elvis De Jesus Marte A/K/A ELVIS MARTE RODRIGUEZ A/K/A ELVIS DE JESUS MARTES RODRIGUEZ (Policy Number 975159404), Horizon Medical, P.C., Jamaica Supplies 1, Inc., Majestic Medical Imaging, P.C., Maplewood Chiropractic, P.C., Metrocare Medical, P.C., Midwood Surgical Supplies, Inc., N. Feldman Family Health Np, P.C., New York Surgery Center Queens, Llc., One Touch Health Supply, Inc., Ortho Light Supply, Inc., Pace Physical Therapy, P.C., Pain Management Associates, Inc., Tri-Borough Ny Medical Practice, P.C., Triumph Pharmacy, Llc., Wise Physical Therapy Pc

Aug 16, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614521/2024

Case

Katerine Delgado Alvarado v. Richard J. Welch, Legend Services Inc., Deyvis Nietozelaya, Johson R. Riveramejia

Aug 14, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614348/2024

Case

Carlos Ramones v. Marriott Hotel Services, Llc d/b/a New York Marriott at the Brooklyn Bridge Hotel, Hudson Sheraton Corp. d/b/a Sheraton New York Times Square Hotel

Aug 14, 2024 |Torts - Other (Labor Law) |Torts - Other (Labor Law) |614302/2024

Case

Jefferson Villafranca, Joseph Aguilar v. Edwin Rodriguez

Aug 16, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614547/2024

Case

Lori Nevias v. Sukhvir Singh, Jaspreet Singh

Aug 15, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |614355/2024

Ruling

JEANETT GERTRUDIZ VS MV TRANSPORTATION, INC.

Case Number: 22STCV03446 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: 29 Gertrudiz v. MV Transportation 22STCV03446 Defendants Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer. Tentative The motion is granted. Background On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff Jeanett Gertrudiz (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant MV Transportation, Inc. (Defendant), and Does 1 to 50, for Damages from an injury sustained while aboard Defendants bus on January 31, 2020. On April 7, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. On June 3, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for leave to file an amended answer. Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 8, and Defendant filed a reply on July 15. This motion was originally set for hearing on July 22 and was continued (as a result of the cyber attack experienced by Los Angeles Superior Court) to August 12. Trial is set for August 27. Legal Authority CCP § 473(a)(1) provides, in relevant part: The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.) Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281, overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390.) Under CRC Rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. Under CRC Rule 3.1324(b), a separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, a long, unwarranted and unexcused delay in presenting it may be a good reason for denial. In most cases, the factors for timeliness are: (1) lack of diligence in discovering the facts or in offering the amendment after knowledge of them; and (2) the effect of the delay on the adverse party. If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation such as an increased burden of discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Discussion Defendant requests leave to amend its answer to add an affirmative defense of Sudden Emergency. This defense is based on the deposition testimony of a critical witness, Linda Hinojos, on April 10, 2024. (Odabachian Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant contends, in effect, that the driver of its bus applied the brakes suddenly to avoid hitting a pedestrian, Ms. Hinojos. Defendant requested a stipulation from Plaintiff on May 29. (Id., ¶ 7 & Exh. B.) Defendant satisfies the procedural requirements for the motion under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a) & (b). Plaintiff has been adequately placed on notice of the nature of the proposed amendment and where it appears in the proposed amended answer. Plaintiff argues that the late amendment, at this time, shortly before trial, would be prejudicial to her. Based on the evidence in the record before the Court, however, Defendant acted reasonably promptly after the deposition of Ms. Hinojos. Plaintiff has been on notice of the testimony of Ms. Hinojos since April, as well as of Defendants request to amend since May. It is unclear to the Court what Plaintiff did, or failed to do, in preparation for trial in reliance on the absence of an affirmative defense of Sudden Emergency, but if Plaintiff can make a sufficient showing of reliance and prejudice, Plaintiff may seek to continue trial and reopen discovery on this limited issue. On this record, and in these circ*mstances, the Court exercises its discretion to grant the motion for leave to amend. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that the motion for leave to amend should be denied because the Sudden Emergency doctrine is not applicable, and that therefore the new proposed affirmative defense has no merit, the Court declines to consider or rule on the merits of the defense in connection with this motion for leave to amend. The motion is granted. Conclusion The Court GRANTS Defendant MV Transportation, Inc.s motion for leave to file an amended answer. The Court GRANTS Defendant leave to file the First Amended Answer attached to its moving papers within 5 days of the hearing on this motion. Moving Party is to give notice. The Judicial Assistant is directed to give notice.

Ruling

SHARA RODRIGUEZ VS JO ANN BORBON, ET AL.

Aug 13, 2024 |22STCV09585

Case Number: 22STCV09585 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: 57 Defendants Joanna Borbon and Francisco Fernando Borbon (collectively, the Borbons) moved for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, on the causes of action that Plaintiff Shara Rodriguez (Rodriguez) asserted against them in her complaint. The basis of the Borbons motion is that there are no triable issues of material fact bearing on the Borbons contention that all six of Rodriguezs causes of action are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations, and that therefore the Borbons are entitled to summary judgment or summary adjudication. The Court agrees and is granting the Borbons motion for summary judgment. Through their separate statement of undisputed material facts submitted with their motion and opening memorandum in support of the motion, the Borbons carried their initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that are no triable issues of material fact on the statute of limitations issued they raised. The burden thus shifted to Rodriguez in her opposition to the motion to present evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2000) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [discussing burden shifting rules in connection with motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication].) Rodriguez failed to carry that burden. Preliminary, the Court notes two procedural defects with Rodriguezs opposition papers. First, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)(2), Rodriguezs opposition papers were due 14 days prior to the hearing on the Borbons motion. Rodriguez missed that deadline by a week. She filed and served her opposition papers only 7 day before the hearing, which left the Borbons with only two days to file and serve their reply papers. Rule 3.1300(d) of the California Rules of Court gives the Court discretion to decline to consider Rodriguezs untimely opposition papers. The Court decided to consider the papers, anyway even though they were very tardy. The Court admonishes Rodriguezs counsel to observe filing deadlines, and, at minimum, to seek an extension of time to file papers if counsel believes that a deadline cannot be met. Second, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)(3), Rodriguez was required to include with her opposition papers a separate statement responding to each of the material set forth in the Borbons separate statement. Rodriguez failed to comply with that requirement. She simply submitted a declaration of her own, along with her brief in opposition to the Borbons motion. Section 437c(b)(3) gives the Court discretion to grant the Borbons motion based on Rodriguezs failure to provide a separate statement with her papers. The Court is declining to exercise that discretion, however, because the evidentiary issues presented by the Borbons motion are relatively minimal and forward thereby limiting the utility for the Court of a separate statement accompanying Rodriguezs opposition papers. (Gilbertson v. Osman (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 308, 315 [discussing the circ*mstances in which a court should consider an opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication even when the opposition papers do not contain a separate statement as required by Section 437c(b)(3); see also Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89, 93-94 [same].) All told, notwithstanding the late-file opposition papers and the absence of a separate statement accompanying those papers, the Court has considered Rodriguezs opposition brief and the declaration she submitted with the opposition. (The Borbons evidentiary objections to the declaration are overruled.) Having considered Rodriguezs brief and declaration, the Court has concluded that Rodriguez failed to carry her burden of showing the existence of triable issues of material fact as to the statute of limitations issues presented by the Borbons in their motion. Rodriguez concedes in her opposition brief and supporting declaration that four of the six causes of action in her complaint against the Borbons are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations. She argues, however, that the remaining two causes of action, which are for an order to quiet title to the real property that is at the heart of this action and for breach of fiduciary duty are subject to a four-year statute of limitations and are not time-barred. Rodriguez bases this argument on the proposition that those two cause of action do not sound in fraud, and hence are not subject to three-year statute of limitations for claims on fraud. Rodriguez has failed to offer any evidence to support that proposition. The allegations in her complaint supporting the quiet title and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action plainly show that those claims rest on assertions of fraudulent conduct by the Borbons. This is critical because a defendants motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is framed by the plaintiffs complaint; put another way, summary judgment/summary adjudication motions are directed at the allegations in the complaint. (Meda v. Autozone, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 366, 373-374; Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.) Nothing in Rodriguezs declaration in support of her opposition to the Borbons motion is to the contrary. Indeed, the declaration, like the complaint itself, speaks of the quiet title and breach of fiduciary claims in terms of fraud by the Borbons. Rodriguezs bald assertion in the declaration that the claims are not predicated on fraud is supported by no evidence whatsoever, just her say-so. Rodriguezs complaint, which, as indicated above, frames the issues for summary judgment/summary adjudication, governs over the unsubstantiated, contrary assertion in the declaration. In sum, the Court has determined that all of Rodriguezs claims are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Borbons are entitled to summary judgment in this action. In light of that determination, the Court is vacating the final status conference and trial in the action. The Court directs counsel for the Borbons to prepare a proposed order memorializing the Courts ruling on their motion for summary judgment and a proposed judgment.

Ruling

FCS057573 - PEREZ, HEIDI JUDITH VS BOOKER, WESLEY (DMS)

Aug 14, 2024 |FCS057573

FCS057573Motions for ContemptTENTATIVE RULING:Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied.No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to thecourt. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to acontempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

Ruling

CASTRELLON HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL. VS VALENZUELA PROPERTIES, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 16, 2024 |21GDCV00807

Case Number: 21GDCV00807 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 08/16/2024 8:30am Case No: 21GDCV00807 Trial Date: 11/18/2024 Case Name: CASTRELLON HOLDINGS, LLC; JOSE CASTRELLON; and GUADALUPE CASTRELLON v. VALENZUELA PROPERTIES, LLC; a California Limited Liability Company; RICHARD VALENZUELA; and DOES 1-10 inclusive TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, Castrellon Holdings LLC, Jose Castrellon, and Guadalupe Castrellon filed a Complaint on 6/9/2021 against Defendants, Valenzuela Properties LLC, and Richard Valenzuela, for: (1) Accounting, (2) Unjust Enrichment and for a Constructive Trust, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Constructive Fraud, (5) Elder Abuse (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30), (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (7) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. On 12/1/2021, Defendants Valenzuela Properties LLC and Richard Valenzuela filed a Cross-Complaint for: (1) Fraud in the Inducement of Contract, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Cancellation of Instruments, (4) Restitution, (5) Unfair Competition in Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., and (6) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff Guadalupe Castrellon (Plaintiff) will move this Court for an order as follows: 1. For an order compelling Defendant Valenzuela Properties, LLC to provide further responses to the request for production of documents (set one) propounded on it on April 30, 2024. Said responses are to contain no objections and that the documents requested be provided. Further, that said responses shall comply with Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §2031.210, §2031.220 or §2031.230, §2031.240, §2031.250 and §2031.280. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Plaintiff will also move and seek an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $4260.00 as against Defendant Valenzuela Properties, LLC and its attorney of record, Dan S. Shapiro, for the cost of having to prepare, file, serve this motion, prepare a separate statement, reviewing any opposition paper, preparing a Reply, as well as Plaintiffs counsels need to appear at a hearing in this matter and for court costs. This motion will be made on the grounds that the Defendant Valenzuela Properties upon its counsels advice has engaged in abuse of the discovery process by insisting without valid grounds on objecting to the requests for production of documents (set one), failing provide complete and straightforward responses and failing to provide responses that comply with Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §2031.210, §2031.220 or §2031.230, §2031.240, §2031.250 and §2031.280. Said motion is further based on this notice, the attached points and authorities, the declaration of Reyes Valenzuela, the attached exhibits, the concurrently filed separate statement, the Courts records and files and on such other oral or documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing. (Pl. Mot. p. 1-2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Guadalupe Castrellon Responding Party: Defendant, Valenzuela Properties, LLC Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Decl. Reyes Valenzuela; Separate Statement Opposition Papers: Opposition Reply Papers: No Reply LEGAL STANDARD COMPEL FURTHER REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Under CCP § 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Section specifically provides that [d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action, and that discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property. CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show good cause for the requestbut unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS 45-Day Requirement Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (CCP §2031.310(c).) Here, Plaintiffs motion appears timely, and Defendant did not object that this motion was untimely with respect to 2031.310(c). Meet and Confer The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (CCP §2031.310(b)(2).) Defendant filed a two page opposition, and the only grounds on which Defendant opposed this motion is that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer. Defendants argument is unavailing. Defendant served responses to the instant discovery request on May 30, 2024. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel requested an extension to file a motion to compel because the due date was approaching. The next day, Defendants counsel denied the request for an extension to file the instant motion. Further, on July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel sent a meet and confer letter explaining why further responses were needed. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. Defendant tries to argue that a meet and confer did not occur because Plaintiff sat on this matter for 42 days then demanded an immediate response. Defendants counsel argues that a response to Plaintiffs extensive, 13-page single-spaced meet and confer was impossible over a two-day weekend. The Court finds Defendants argument unavailing for two reasons. One, Defendant points to no legal authority that a meet and confer has to be served a specific number of days before the 45-day deadline to file the motion to compel further. Second, and most importantly, Plaintiff requested an extension to file the motion to compel further, but Defendant was the one who denied Plaintiffs request. Granting an extension to file the motion would have allowed the parties further time to meet and confer. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants opposition states that the discovery cut-off was August 18, 2023. Defendants counsel needs to explain why it is stating the discovery cut-off was August 18, 2023 when Plaintiffs counsel is stating that pursuant to a stipulation the discovery cut-off is October 18, 2024. Defendants Opposition does not address the merits of any of the arguments asserted by Plaintiff. In fact, Defendant submitted a two-page opposition that argues only that Plaintiff did not properly meet and confer. Defendants argument on Plaintiff failing to meet and confer is unavailing. Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to RFPs 1-44 and 46-98, Set One, propounded on Defendant Valenzuela LLC is GRANTED. Sanctions Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2031.310(h).) The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a).) Plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of $4,260.0 against Defendant Valenzuela Properties, LLC and its attorney of record, Dan S. Shapiro. Plaintiffs counsel requests sanctions as follows: (a) I have spent 6 hours in preparing for this motion and the separate statement. (b) I will be spending 3.0 hours reviewing the opposition and preparing a Reply. (c) I expect to spend 1.5 hours in appearing at a hearing on this motion. (d) The cost of filing this motion is $60.00. (e) My regular and customary hourly fee for legal services is $400.00 per hour. (Reyes Decl. ¶ 21.) The Court will hear argument. The Court notes that no Reply was submitted.

Ruling

HACKWORTH, et al. vs. BERKEY

Aug 12, 2024 |CVPO21-0197833

HACKWORTH, ET AL. VS. BERKEYCase Number: CVPO21-0197833This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of bankruptcy. As previously noted, theCourt is in receipt of a Stipulated Judgment in this matter. However, the Court remains withoutjurisdiction because this matter is currently stayed by the bankruptcy court. This Court will needan order granting the parties relief from the stay before this Court can execute the StipulatedJudgment. The parties have filed Case Management Statements indicating that the parties areseeking relief from the bankruptcy stay so that this matter may be resolved. This matter iscontinued to Tuesday, November 12, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 64 for review regardingstatus of bankruptcy. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

IRENE LOMELI, ET AL. VS RICARDO MENOLA GARCIA, ET AL.

Aug 12, 2024 |22STCV18512

Case Number: 22STCV18512 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On June 6, 2022, Plaintiffs Irene Lomeli, Jaleen Jones, and Angel Alston (Alston) filed this action against Defendants Ricardo Menola Garcia, Activ Enterprises, LLC (Activ), and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On October 18, 2022, Activ filed an answer. On February 2, 2023, Defendant Ricardo Mendiola Garcia (erroneously sued and served as Ricardo Menola Garcia) (Garcia) filed an answer. On May 17, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs counsels motion to be relieved as Alstons counsel. On January 26, 2024, the Court dismissed the claims of Plaintiffs Irene Lomeli and Jaleen Jones with prejudice at their request. On July 8, 2024, Activ and Garcia (Defendants) filed a motion for terminating sanctions against Alson, to be heard on August 12, 2024. Alson has not filed an opposition. Trial is currently scheduled for September 26, 2024. PARTIES REQUESTS Defendants ask the Court to impose terminating sanctions on Alston. LEGAL STANDARD A. Monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides in part: To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: (a) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (b) The court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (c) The court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (e) The court may impose a contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court. (f) (1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other section of this title, absent exceptional circ*mstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system. (2) This subdivision shall not be construed to alter any obligation to preserve discoverable information. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) B. Sanctions for failure to comply with Court order compelling response to demand for inspection Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (c), provides in part: If a party . . . fails to obey [an] order [under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (b)] compelling a response [to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling], the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).) C. Sanctions for failure to comply with Court order compelling response to interrogatories Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290, subdivision (c), provides in part: If a party then fails to obey an order [under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290, subdivision (b)] compelling answers [to interrogatories], the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) D. Terminating sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders A violation of a discovery order supports the imposition of terminating sanctions. (Collison & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620.) Terminating sanctions are appropriate when a party persists in disobeying the court's orders. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 795-796 (Deyo).) A terminating sanction is a "drastic measure which should be employed with caution." (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 793.) "A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction." (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280.) DISCUSSION On March 19, 2024, the Court (1) granted Activs motions to compel Alstons responses to requests for production of documents, set two, and ordered Alston to serve verified code-compliant responses, without objections, and to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by April 18, 2024, (2) granted Activs motion to compel Alstons responses to special interrogatories, set two, and ordered Alston to serve verified code-compliant responses to the special interrogatories without objections by April 18, 2024, (3) granted Activs motion to compel Alstons responses to form interrogatories, set two, and ordered Alston to serve verified code-compliant responses to the form interrogatories without objections by April 18, 2024, and (4) granted Activs motion to compel Alstons responses to requests for admission, set two, and ordered Alston to serve verified code-compliant responses to the requests for admission without objections by April 18, 2024. Alston failed to comply with the Courts March 19, 2024 order. On June 6, 2024, in response to Activs initial motion for terminating sanctions, the Court reinstated the March 19, 2024 order and ordered Alston to comply with the March 19, 2024 order by July 6, 2024. The Court also imposed monetary sanctions on Alston. Defendants have moved again for terminating sanctions, asserting that Alston has not complied with the June 6, 2024 or March 19, 2024 orders. The proof of service attached to Defendants motion states that Defendants electronically served their motion on Alston. Under California Rules of Court, rule 2.251(c)(3)(B), self-represented parties are to be served by non-electronic methods unless they affirmatively consent to electronic service. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(c)(3)(B); see Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c).) The Court has not seen any evidence that Alston consented to receive electronic service after the Court relieved his former attorney. Therefore, the Court denies the motion without prejudice due to lack of proper service. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice the motion for terminating sanctions filed by Defendants Ricardo Mendiola Garcia (erroneously sued and served as Ricardo Menola Garcia) and Activ Enterprises, LLC. Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving parties are ordered to file proof of service of this ruling within five days.

Ruling

LONGORIA vs RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Aug 12, 2024 |CVRI2204798

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE ON 3RDAMENDED COMPLAINT FOR OTHERLONGORIA VS RIVERSIDEPERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTYCVRI2204798 COUNTY SHERIFF'SDAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORTDEPARTMENT(OVER $25,000) OF CARLOSLONGORIA BY CARLOS LONGORIATentative Ruling:DENY, without prejudice.The GUY matter is currently set for a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment on January24, 2025. In addition, the parties have expressed an interest in private mediation in the GUYmatter. For these reasons, this motion is procedurally premature. The court denies the motionwithout prejudice, and without reaching the merits of consolidation at this time.

Ruling

FCS059298 - THOMPSON, FELICIA V. SAUKHLA, M.D., NARINDER (DMS)

Aug 12, 2024 |FCS059298

FCS059298PORTUGAL’s Motion for Summary JudgmentTENTATIVE RULINGDefendant RUTH PORTUGAL, R.N. (“PORTUGAL”) moves for summary judgment onPlaintiff FELICIA THOMPSON’s cause of action for wrongful death via medicalnegligence. Summarized, Plaintiff alleges that PORTUGAL’s failure to observe thestandard of care applicable to a nurse caused the death of Plaintiff’s father (“Decedent”)on September 2, 2017.Objections to Evidence. In ruling on a motion for summary adjudication the courtneed only rule on those evidentiary objections that it deems material to its disposition ofthe motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)PORTUGAL’s Objections #1-10. PORTUGAL’s objections #1-10 are overruled.PORTUGAL’s Objections #11-22. PORTUGAL’s objections to Plaintiff’s declarationsfrom Melvin Smith, Michael Burrus, Cole Bienek, Earl Miller, James Cross, JohnLawyer, Herman Davis, Clarence Myers, Shelvert Dyer, Lamar Minor, and MichaelDavis, as well as the second supplemental declaration of Dr. Dan Field, on the basis offailure to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 are sustained. Thoughthe declarations are not hearsay they do not meet Code of Civil Procedure section2015.5 requirements. (Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th601, 609 [declarations of personal knowledge admissible on summary judgment].) Alldeclarations but Dr. Field’s fail to state the date and place of execution of thedeclarations. Dr. Field’s second supplemental declaration does not state the place.PORTUGAL’s Objections #23-24. PORTUGAL’s objections to all proffered evidencefrom Dr. Field, being his two declarations, a rebuttal declaration to defense expertopinions, and deposition excerpts, are sustained. A doctor may speak to the standardof care for a nurse if he possesses relevant qualifications or knowledge. (Lattimore v.Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 970 (Lattimore).) However, Dr. Field’squalifications and knowledge are solely set forth in his second supplementaldeclaration, which fails to meet Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 requirements.Accordingly Plaintiff does not establish with admissible evidence that Dr. Field canspeak to the standard of care applicable to PORTUGAL.Similarly, Dr. Fields’ opinions as a medical doctor are also lacking in foundation. Neitherthe Record Review Report dated 12/11/2020 or the Rebuttal Report dated 1/14/2021state Dr. Fields’ qualifications. The Second Supplemental Declaration, which does statethe doctor’s qualifications, does not cure the problem as the declaration is procedurallydefective under CCP 2015.5.The court does not consider PORTUGAL’s remaining objections material to thedisposition of the motion.Requests for Judicial Notice. Matters subject to judicial notice may support a motionfor summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The court takes judicialnotice of all items proffered by PORTUGAL, being documents from Plaintiff’s federalcase preceding this one on the same facts, as records of a court of the United Statesper Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).Legal Standard. A defendant may move for summary judgment on the basis that theplaintiff cannot establish an element of his cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,subd. (o)(1).) A summary judgment motion is properly granted where the evidence insupport of the moving party would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor andhis opponent does not show facts sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. (Parker v.Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 (Parker).) The motion isnot to be granted where any triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) The affidavits ofthe moving party are strictly construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summaryjudgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (Ibid.) Reasonableinferences from the evidence must be drawn in the light most favorable to the opposingparty. (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1155.)Affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, andmatters judicially noticed may all support a motion for summary judgment, provided theycontain admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 437c, subds. (b)(1), (d).) Allegationsin a party’s own pleadings may not satisfy deficiencies in evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (p).) Allegations in an opposing party’s pleadings may be consideredevidence, however. (Parker, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 181.) Additionally, a defendant doesnot meet its burden of showing a plaintiff cannot establish an element merely bypointing out the absence of evidence; the defendant must show that the plaintiff bothdoes not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence. (Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc.(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286-1287.)Wrongful Death via Medical Negligence. Wrongful death is a statutory cause ofaction, the elements of which are simply a tort resulting in death and damages.(Lattimore, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) In this case Plaintiff alleges the wrongfuldeath of Decedent due to the underlying tort of medical malpractice or negligence.(First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 38-44.) Medical negligence is a form of negligence, towhich general principles of negligence apply. (Massey v. Mercy Medical CenterRedding (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 690, 695.) Thus a medical practitioner is negligent ifhe fails to use the standard of care that a reasonably careful practitioner would use insimilar circ*mstances, but what the standard of care is for a medical practitioner is amatter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts. (Ibid.) The standard of care for amedical practitioner may therefore only be proven by the testimony of experts unlessthe conduct required in the circ*mstances is something within the common knowledgeof laymen. (Ibid.) In other words, a plaintiff usually may only prove that a medicalpractitioner failed to meet the standard of care via expert testimony. (Ibid.) Theforegoing rules of analysis apply whether the practitioner is a doctor or a nurse; anurse’s conduct is not measured by the same standard of care as a doctor’s butlikewise must be assessed by expert testimony from one qualified to speak to theappropriate profession’s standard of care. (Lattimore at p. 969.)On moving for summary judgment a medical practitioner will accordingly have the initialburden to present evidence, supported by expert testimony where necessary, thathis/her acts met the applicable standard of care, else the motion must be denied.PORTUGAL carries her initial burden as to the standard of care issue. The Declarationof Nancy Booth in Support of PORTUGAL’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Booth)states that PORTUGAL observed the relevant standard of care (Booth at ¶ 17.) Ms.Booth declares she is qualified to speak to the standard of care for a nurse inPORTUGAL’s circ*mstances because she is a licensed registered nurse with almostfifty years’ experience who has been a certified correctional setting health careprofessional since 2013 and worked in a correctional health care setting from 2006 to2021. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3.) Ms. Booth reviewed Decedent’s general medical records, therecords from September 2, 2017, and numerous documents generated in the course ofthis litigation. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Ms. Booth explains that in the context of the unusually hotday on September 2, 2017 it was reasonable for PORTUGAL to believe Decedentsuffered heat-related problems and perform associated assessments and treatment.(Id. at ¶ 18.) Ms. Booth states that Decedent was able to answer questions and obeycommands and so it was reasonable for PORTUGAL to not explore a possible alteredmental state. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Ms. Booth states that it was reasonable to believeDecedent’s problems had resolved because he displayed improved vital signs aftertreatment. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Additional tests such as rectal thermometer and orthostaticblood pressure readings were not necessary to meet the standard of care becauseDecedent was a conscious adult male whose vital signs were able to be accessed inother ways. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Ms. Booth connects her opinions to facts and offerscompetent expert testimony that PORTUGAL met the standard of care.Plaintiff’s admissible evidence suffices to raise triable issues of material fact on theissue of the standard of care. In paragraph 13 of the Ron Lopez declaration he statesthat PORTUGAL observed that Decedent was dehydrated yet performed no evaluationof urine specific gravity, orthostatic blood pressure, or fluid intake and output. Thisdirectly counters Ms. Booth’s assertion that there was no need to examine Decedent’sorthostatic blood pressure and raises a triable issue of material fact on the standard ofcare given that the defense position hinges on the idea that PORTUGAL respondedappropriately to presented dehydration. In paragraph 14 Mr. Lopez states thatPORTUGAL observed “10/10” pain from Decedent for two and a half hours but did notperform a PQRST pain assessment or document the effect of the analgesics provided.This too raises an issue as to the standard of care in the circ*mstances Decedentpresented.On the issue of causation, however, PORTUGAL fails to meet her initial burden. In amedical negligence case, causation must be proven with expert testimony. (Bromme v.Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593,1603; Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.) In the context of a motion for summary judgment, it stands to reason that experttestimony is needed to negate causation. PORTUGAL offers no expert evidence tonegate causation. She uses only a layperson’s analysis based on the disputed factssurrounding Decedent’s cause of death to conclude that there is no evidence thatresponding differently to Decedent’s initial presentation would have changed histreatment outcome.Conclusion. PORTUGAL’s motion for summary judgment is denied.Department 7 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting.Join ZoomGov Meetinghttps://solano-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/1611554664?pwd=T3U4QlBGWWNWaGlieXJTcGxIVHRXZz09Meeting ID: 161 155 4664Passcode: 818575One tap mobile+16692545252,,1611554664#,,,,*818575# US (San Jose)+14154494000,,1611554664#,,,,*818575# US (US Spanish Line)

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